The rational solution was a market-sharing agreement in which the three companies agreed to accept their share of the current market and a proportionate share of future oil demand growth. The two weeks of Achnacarry talks resulted in the 17-day “As Is” agreement, also known as the Pool Association, which was agreed but not signed. Under the agreement, each company was allocated a quota in different markets, but the agreement excluded the US domestic market in order to avoid any breach of US anti-dominant law. In addition to quotas, companies have agreed to reduce costs, share facilities, and be cautious in building new refineries and other facilities. A few months later, industry leaders agreed to also control production. This is how the agreement essentially constituted an international oil cartel! Cartels usually control or set prices, markets and production. However, the deal collapsed when companies again attacked other`s markets. The Soviet Union, absent from the agreement, had to be consulted for any chance of success, given that the Soviet company Russian Oil Products was the 4th largest importer in the United Kingdom. Shortly after Achnacarry, 17 U.S. companies created the Export Petroleum Association under the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, which allowed U.S.
companies to do overseas what antitrust law would not allow them to do in the United States. Differences of opinion on the distribution of production between US and European companies led to the failure of the attempted “cartel” on US oil exports, which further undermined the “As Is” agreement. In addition, there was too much production outside the “As Is” framework to be effective, and the Achnacarry agreement and the attempted “cartel” on international oil production failed. Participation agreements: the NOC is “supported” by an International Oil Company (IOC). The NOC weighs on the IOC by not fully compensating the IOC for the risks assumed during exploration or commercial discovery. The IOC is facing significant losses and therefore needs greater success to compensate for this situation based on the NOC`s share in the joint venture. However, the IOC takes advantage, for example, of the fact that it has the NOK as a partner when confronted with nationalist treats. The impact of the agreement on the position of oil producers in the Middle East has been profound. It has been instrumental in the reluctance of dealers to increase production in this low-cost region.
In 1928, when it was introduced, more than a third of the world`s production capacity was closed due to oversupply. The owners feared that the development of inexpensive capabilities in the Persian Gulf would only increase their losses. The As Is and Red Line agreements delayed the exploitation of oil resources in the Middle East until after World War II; At the same time, they led to the depletion of reserves in areas later considered “safe” politically, such as the United States and Canada. The resulting distribution of production shares between Middle Eastern countries and other countries has exacerbated anti-colonial and anti-Western sentiments among the population of many Middle Eastern countries, especially Iraq and Iran. It also established a model for safeguarding oil profits through the exercise of market control, which members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries subsequently tried to emulate. . . .